LjL/ddlmZmZddlZddlmZddlmZddlm Z m Z m Z Gddej e Z Gdd ej e ZdS) )ClassVarOptionalN)encoding) exceptions)EncryptedMessage StringFixerrandomc |eZdZUdZejjZee e d<ejj Z ee e d<ejj Zee e d<ejjZee e d<ejfdedejfdZd efd Zd ejfd ed eedejd efdZd ejfded eedejd efdZd S) SecretBoxuS The SecretBox class encrypts and decrypts messages using the given secret key. The ciphertexts generated by :class:`~nacl.secret.Secretbox` include a 16 byte authenticator which is checked as part of the decryption. An invalid authenticator will cause the decrypt function to raise an exception. The authenticator is not a signature. Once you've decrypted the message you've demonstrated the ability to create arbitrary valid message, so messages you send are repudiable. For non-repudiable messages, sign them after encryption. Encryption is done using `XSalsa20-Poly1305`_, and there are no practical limits on the number or size of messages (up to 2⁶⁴ messages, each up to 2⁶⁴ bytes). .. _XSalsa20-Poly1305: https://doc.libsodium.org/secret-key_cryptography/secretbox#algorithm-details :param key: The secret key used to encrypt and decrypt messages :param encoder: The encoder class used to decode the given key :cvar KEY_SIZE: The size that the key is required to be. :cvar NONCE_SIZE: The size that the nonce is required to be. :cvar MACBYTES: The size of the authentication MAC tag in bytes. :cvar MESSAGEBYTES_MAX: The maximum size of a message which can be safely encrypted with a single key/nonce pair. KEY_SIZE NONCE_SIZEMACBYTESMESSAGEBYTES_MAXkeyencoderc||}t|tstjdt ||jkrtjd|jz||_dS)Nz'SecretBox must be created from 32 bytes%The key must be exactly %s bytes long decode isinstancebytesexc TypeErrorlenr ValueError_keyselfrrs O/home/ice/.hermes/hermes-agent/venv/lib/python3.11/site-packages/nacl/secret.py__init__zSecretBox.__init__;swnnS!!#u%% K- IJJ J s88t} $ $.7$-G  returnc|jSNrrs r __bytes__zSecretBox.__bytes__I yr!N plaintextnoncec|t|j}t||jkrtjd|jzt j|||j}| |}| |}tj ||| ||zS)aL Encrypts the plaintext message using the given `nonce` (or generates one randomly if omitted) and returns the ciphertext encoded with the encoder. .. warning:: It is **VITALLY** important that the nonce is a nonce, i.e. it is a number used only once for any given key. If you fail to do this, you compromise the privacy of the messages encrypted. Give your nonces a different prefix, or have one side use an odd counter and one an even counter. Just make sure they are different. :param plaintext: [:class:`bytes`] The plaintext message to encrypt :param nonce: [:class:`bytes`] The nonce to use in the encryption :param encoder: The encoder to use to encode the ciphertext :rtype: [:class:`nacl.utils.EncryptedMessage`] N'The nonce must be exactly %s bytes long) r r rrrnaclbindingscrypto_secretboxrencoder _from_parts)rr)r*r ciphertext encoded_nonceencoded_ciphertexts rencryptzSecretBox.encryptLs, =4?++E u:: ( (.9DOK ]33 udi   u-- $^^J77+   NN5:- . .   r!r2c$||}||d|j}||jd}t||jkrtjd|jzt j|||j}|Sa Decrypts the ciphertext using the `nonce` (explicitly, when passed as a parameter or implicitly, when omitted, as part of the ciphertext) and returns the plaintext message. :param ciphertext: [:class:`bytes`] The encrypted message to decrypt :param nonce: [:class:`bytes`] The nonce used when encrypting the ciphertext :param encoder: The encoder used to decode the ciphertext. :rtype: [:class:`bytes`] Nr,) rr rrrr-r.crypto_secretbox_openr)rr2r*rr)s rdecryptzSecretBox.decryptws$^^J// =001E#DO$5$56J u:: ( (.9DOK M77 ty  r!)__name__ __module__ __qualname____doc__r-r.crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTESr rint__annotations__crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTESr crypto_secretbox_MACBYTESr!crypto_secretbox_MESSAGEBYTES_MAXrr RawEncoderrEncoderr r'rrr5r9r!rr r s:#mEHhsmEEE $ IJ III"mEHhsmEEE 7h 888 7?6I   #+#3    5 "&$,$7 ) ) ) ) ! )  ) ) ) ) \"&$,$7 """"! "  """"""r!r c .eZdZdZejjZejjZ ejj Z ejj Z ejfdedejfdZdefdZddejfd ed ed eedejdef d Zddejfd ed ed eedejdef dZdS)Aeadu The AEAD class encrypts and decrypts messages using the given secret key. Unlike :class:`~nacl.secret.SecretBox`, AEAD supports authenticating non-confidential data received alongside the message, such as a length or type tag. Like :class:`~nacl.secret.Secretbox`, this class provides authenticated encryption. An inauthentic message will cause the decrypt function to raise an exception. Likewise, the authenticator should not be mistaken for a (public-key) signature: recipients (with the ability to decrypt messages) are capable of creating arbitrary valid message; in particular, this means AEAD messages are repudiable. For non-repudiable messages, sign them after encryption. The cryptosystem used is `XChacha20-Poly1305`_ as specified for `standardization`_. There are `no practical limits`_ to how much can safely be encrypted under a given key (up to 2⁶⁴ messages each containing up to 2⁶⁴ bytes). .. _standardization: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha .. _XChacha20-Poly1305: https://doc.libsodium.org/secret-key_cryptography/aead#xchacha-20-poly1305 .. _no practical limits: https://doc.libsodium.org/secret-key_cryptography/aead#limitations :param key: The secret key used to encrypt and decrypt messages :param encoder: The encoder class used to decode the given key :cvar KEY_SIZE: The size that the key is required to be. :cvar NONCE_SIZE: The size that the nonce is required to be. :cvar MACBYTES: The size of the authentication MAC tag in bytes. :cvar MESSAGEBYTES_MAX: The maximum size of a message which can be safely encrypted with a single key/nonce pair. rrc||}t|tstjdt ||jkrtjd|jz||_dS)Nz"AEAD must be created from 32 bytesrrrs rr z Aead.__init__sw nnS!!#u%% F- DEE E s88t} $ $.7$-G  r!r"c|jSr$r%r&s rr'zAead.__bytes__r(r!r!Nr)aadr*c|t|j}t||jkrtjd|jzt j||||j}| |}| |}tj ||| ||zS)a@ Encrypts the plaintext message using the given `nonce` (or generates one randomly if omitted) and returns the ciphertext encoded with the encoder. .. warning:: It is vitally important for :param nonce: to be unique. By default, it is generated randomly; [:class:`Aead`] uses XChacha20 for extended (192b) nonce size, so the risk of reusing random nonces is negligible. It is *strongly recommended* to keep this behaviour, as nonce reuse will compromise the privacy of encrypted messages. Should implicit nonces be inadequate for your application, the second best option is using split counters; e.g. if sending messages encrypted under a shared key between 2 users, each user can use the number of messages it sent so far, prefixed or suffixed with a 1bit user id. Note that the counter must **never** be rolled back (due to overflow, on-disk state being rolled back to an earlier backup, ...) :param plaintext: [:class:`bytes`] The plaintext message to encrypt :param nonce: [:class:`bytes`] The nonce to use in the encryption :param encoder: The encoder to use to encode the ciphertext :rtype: [:class:`nacl.utils.EncryptedMessage`] Nr,) r r rrrr-r.*crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_encryptrr0rr1)rr)rKr*rr2r3r4s rr5z Aead.encrypts< =4?++E u:: ( (.9DOK ]MM sE49   u-- $^^J77+   NN5:- . .   r!r2c&||}||d|j}||jd}t||jkrtjd|jzt j||||j}|Sr7) rr rrrr-r.*crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_decryptr)rr2rKr*rr)s rr9z Aead.decrypts&^^J// =001E#DO$5$56J u:: ( (.9DOK MLL UDI  r!)r:r;r<r=r-r.+crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_KEYBYTESr ,crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTESr )crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTESr3crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_MESSAGEBYTES_MAXrrrDrrEr r'rrr5r9rFr!rrHrHsZ""H}HHKJ}FH I%-$7 ! 5 !%$,$7 1 1 1 1  1 ! 1  1 1 1 1 l!%$,$7 #### # ! #  ######r!rH)typingrr nacl.bindingsr-rrr nacl.utilsrrr Encodabler rHrFr!rrXs&%%%%%%%""""""<<<<<<<<<<CCCCC"KCCCLUUUUU8 {UUUUUr!